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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court correctly held that Plaintiffs/Appellants

("Plaintiffs") do not have standing to enforce the terms of the June 25, 1975
Agreement (the "Agreement") between Bell Mountain Corporation (CCBMC3) and
Defendant/Appellee Sandy City (the "City55) because the Agreement is not a
covenant that runs with the land.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in the City's
Memoranda in Support of its Motion to Dismiss [R. 66-83; 115-131], the City's
Memoranda in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 237-302; 711722] and during the bench trial in this matter. [R. 1464-65.]
Standard of Review: Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadow Homeowners Ass'n v. Wasatch
County, 2001 UT App 414,11 7, 40 P.3d 1148. The question of whether the
evidence adequately supports a trial court's findings of fact, which in turn form the
basis of its interpretation of contract terms, is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Menzies v. Galitka, 2006 UT 81, If 55,150 P.3d 480.

II.

Whether the evidence supports the finding of the trial court that

Plaintiffs do not have standing to enforce the Agreement because the Agreement was
not lawfully assigned to the Plaintiffs.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in the City's
Memoranda in Support of its Motion to Dismiss [R. 66-83; 115-131], the City's
Memoranda in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 237-302; 711722] and during the bench trial in this matter. [R. 1464-65.]
Standard of Review: The question of whether the evidence adequately
supports a trial court's findings of fact is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Menzies v. Galitka, 2006 UT 81,11 55,150 P.3d 480.
III. Whether the trial court correctly held that Plaintiffs do not have standing
to enforce the Agreement because Plaintiffs are not third party beneficiaries to the
Agreement.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved in the trial court in Plaintiffs5
Memoranda in Support of their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 306-692]
and during the bench trial in this matter. [R. 1464-65.]
Standard of Review: Interpretation of contract terms is a question of law
which is reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Homeowners Ass'n v. Wasatch
County, 2001 UT App 414,11 7, 40 P.3d 1148. The question of whether the

2

evidence adequately supports a trial court's findings of fact which in turn form the
basis of its interpretation of contract terms is reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard. Menzies v. Galitka, 2006 UT 81, II 55, 150 P.3d 480.
PROVISIONS OF STATUTES AND RULES
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l) (1992) is of
importance to this appeal; a copy of this statute is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This is a breach of contract case arising out of an Agreement between BMC
and the City dated June 25, 1975. The City moved to dismiss and later for summary
judgment arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the Agreement. Both
motions were denied because of perceived factual questions. In order to resolve the
factual matters, a bench trial was held on October 21 and 22, 2008 before the
Honorable Royal I. Hansen. Following trial, Judge Hansen ordered the parties to
submit Supplemental1 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law with citations to the
trial record, including citations to trial exhibits and the trial transcript. Judge
Hansen also ordered the parties to submit post-trial briefs with similar citations to
the trial record. Judge Hansen then heard closing arguments on December 10,
1

The parties had each submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law prior to trial.
3

2008. Judge Hansen issued his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
on January 27, 2009, holding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to enforce the
Agreement, and further observing that even if standing did exist, under the contract
terms, no breach had occurred. The Order of January 27, 2009, requested the City
to submit a final Judgment which it did on February 12, 2009. Plaintiffs objected to
the form of Judgment and then prior to its entry, filed a Motion for Relief from
Judgment on April 17, 2009 under Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
claiming they had acquired newly discovered evidence. Judge Hansen issued and
entered Judgment of Dismissal on May 13, 2009. Plaintiffs filed their Notice of
Appeal on June 1, 2009. After Plaintiffs had filed their Notice of Appeal, Judge
Hansen issued his ruling on Plaintiffs3 Motion for Relief from Judgment on June 30,
2009.2 No other notice of appeal was filed thereafter.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Rather than follow the time-honored process of marshaling evidence and
challenging Findings of Fact with which they disagree, Plaintiffs have chosen to
characterize all issues in this appeal as legal issues and selectively cite to the record for

2

Because the Notice of Appeal was filed prior to entry of the Ruling and
Order on the post-trial motions, no matters raised in the Rule 59 Motion can be
heard in this appeal. Rule 4(b)(2), Utah R. Appellate Proc.
4

factual statements to support their assertions, regardless of whether they conflict
with the findings of the trial court. See, e.g., paragraph 49 of the Statement of Facts
in Plaintiffs3 Brief vs. Finding of Fact 11 5.B.I. They likewise state legal conclusions
as facts, even though they direcdy conflict with conclusions of law drawn by the trial
court. I d This approach alone gives this Court the discretion to ignore such
assertions and accept as true the findings of the lower court. United Park City Mines
v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonck 2006 UT 35,11 26,140 P.3d 1200; Chen
v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,11 20, 100 P.3d 1177.
The following Facts consist of those facts found by the trial court and
unchallenged on this appeal that were relied upon by the trial court in reaching its
conclusion that Plaintiffs had no standing to enforce the Agreement.
FACT STATEMENT
Context of the Agreement, This dispute arises out of the Agreement
executed between the City and BMC on June 25,1975. BMC was the owner and
developer of a large tract of land on the east side of the City referred to as the
"Pepperwood Subdivision55 and identified as "Horman properties55 in the Agreement.
[R. 1118 at H l.] 3 Plaintiff Charles Horman was the president and Plaintiff Gordon
3

For the Court's convenience, a true and correct copy of the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order are attached hereto as
Addendum B. [R. 1117-1130]. The City will hereinafter cite to the trial court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Addendum B.
5

Johnson was the vice-president of BMC. [Ex. 32.] At the time the City and BMC
entered into the Agreement, only a portion of the Pepperwood Subdivision had been
annexed into the City, about 141 RP Zoned lots, some of which had been sold to
individual lot owners. [Addendum B 11 3.] The only lots located in the RP Zone
consisted of Phases I, II and III of the Pepperwood Subdivision. [Id n.2.] The
remaining property owned by BMC was either zoned ccA-lff (agricultural), or had
not yet been annexed into the City. [Id.]
Prior to 1975, Salt Lake County was responsible for flood control on the east
side of the City, including the property then owned by BMC. [Addendum B 11
5.B.2.] The City assumed this responsibility in February of 1975. [Id.] Salt Lake
County - and eventually the City - charged developers such as BMC flood control
fees to provide a source of funds to construct and maintain infrastructure to control
surface flood water resulting from storms. [R. 1465; Tr. p. 327.] If Salt Lake
County or the City was not required to build and maintain infrastructure on a
developer's property to control surface flood water, then neither the County nor the
City charged the developer flood control fees for that development. [R. 1465; Tr.
pp. 358-359.]
During the time Salt Lake County was responsible for flood control on the
east side of the City, it developed a map which identified certain portions of the

6

Pepperwood Subdivision where it was anticipated that natural precipitation would
be absorbed into the ground on site due to the sandy soil conditions and the
relatively flat topography. [Addendum B 11 5.B.2; Ex. 114; R. 1465; Tr. pp. 322324, 427-428.] The first nine (9) phases of the Pepperwood Subdivision are located
in that certain portion of property identified on the map where it was anticipated
that natural precipitation would be absorbed into the ground on site due to the
sandy soil conditions and the relatively flat topography. [Addendum B 11 5.B.2.J
Thus, minimal flood control infrastructure was required in the first nine phases of
Pepperwood and, prior to the execution of the Agreement, neither Salt Lake
County, nor the City charged BMC any flood control fees on Phases I and II of the
Pepperwood Subdivision. [Id.]
Final approval of the Phase III plat was still pending before the City just prior
to execution of the Agreement. [R. 1465; Tr. pp. 347-349.] Consistent with
Phases I and II, BMC, through its president Plaintiff Charles Horman, originally
requested that the County waive the flood control fees associated with Phase III of
Pepperwood because cc[a]ccording to our sources, the pervious sand conditions as
exist in areas such as Pepperwood are more effective in collecting water than storm
sewers, which carry water off too quickly and lower the water table.33 [Ex. 4.] Mr.
Horman subsequently requested that the City waive the flood control fees on Phase

7

Ill because "potential flood damage up to a ten (10) year storm becomes the
responsibility of the Pepperwood Homeowners Association which owns the road
system.55 [Ex. 3.]
Prior to the execution of the Agreement, the City experienced a rapid growth
of subdivisions being annexed into the City. [R. 1465; Tr. p. 340.] This rapid
growth stressed the City's ability to provide adequate water services to the newly
annexed subdivisions. [R. 1465; Tr. pp. 340, 343.] In an effort to address the
infrastructure shortage created by the volume of annexations, on April 23,1975, the
City declared a 90-day moratorium on the acceptance of new subdivisions within the
City limits or any new annexations lying outside the exterior boundaries of the City
due to a capacity problem in the City's water system. [Ex. 110; R. 1465; Tr. pp.
344-345.] On May 7,1975, the City also passed an ordinance requiring that prior
to final approval of new subdivision plats by the City, developers must "pre-pay55 the
water connection fees for each lot identified on the proposed subdivision plat. [Ex.
124.] Because final approval of Phase III was still pending prior to the execution of
the Agreement, the moratorium on approving subdivision plats precluded the final
approval of Phase III of Pepperwood. [R. 1465; Tr. pp. 347-349.] In addition, the
May 9, 1975 Ordinance would also have required BMC to "pre-pay55 all water
connection fees for the lots identified on the Phase III plat. [Ex. 124.]

8

In an effort to gain final approval of Phase III and move forward with
development of its property, BMC entered into the Agreement with the City.
[Addendum B 1f 2 n.l; Ex. 6(c); R. 1464; Tr. pp. 33-34.] In the preamble of the
Agreement, the parties acknowledged that the City cchas a need to increase water
storage and production in its corporate limits particularly on its east side55 and that
"Bell Mountain is developing a large tract of land on the City's east side.55
[Addendum B 11 2; Ex. 6(c).] The preamble further provides that BMC "desires to
assist Sandy in achieving its goals regarding water development and distribution
while likewise developing its own properties.55 [Id.]
Under the terms of the Agreement, BMC agreed to design and construct a
three-million gallon water reservoir which would help alleviate the stress on the
City's ability to provide adequate water services to the newly annexed subdivisions.
[Ex. 6(c); R. 1464; Tr. pp. 33-34.] Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the
City paid BMC $300,000 for construction costs related to the reservoir.4 [R. 1465;

4

Throughout their Statement of Facts, Plaintiffs make multiple statements
which either directly, or indirectly, suggest that "the water rights and well given up
by the Hormans in the 1975 Contract are worth millions of dollars.55 [Pis.5 Br. p.
13.] Despite Plaintiffs5 unsubstantiated statements, however, no credible evidence
regarding the actual value of the water rights referred to was ever presented at trial.
Moreover, any such evidence would have been wholly irrelevant and immaterial to
the trial court's interpretation of the Agreement and ultimate determination that
Plaintiffs lack standing to enforce the Agreement.
9

Tr. p. 350.] The Agreement further provided that the City would not require BMC
to pre-pay the water connection fees pursuant to the May 7,1975 Ordinance, and
the City confirmed its decision not to charge BMC flood control maintenance fees
on Phase III of the Pepperwood Subdivision:
In consideration of the above mentioned efforts and
expenditures of Bell Mountain Corporation, Sandy shall
defer payment of all water connection fees and charges
which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain
Corporation and Horman properties located east of 2000
East north of 12000 South and south of 10000 South
until such time as building permits are applied for by the
individual owners of the lots contained therein and shall
require payment from the said individual owners rather
than Bell Mountain Corporation such fees as may be
required shall be charged as provided by the then covenant
fee resolution except that with relation to lots located
in the CRP Zone', neither Bell Mountain Corporation
nor the owners of the said lots located in the
Pepperwood Subdivision shall be required to pay
'flood control fees3 as part of a connection fee and shall
pay only one-half of the otherwise required cpark fee,'
[Ex. 6(c) 1112 (emphasis added).]
Consistent with the terms of the Agreement, BMC did not pay flood control
fees on Phase III of Pepperwood.5 [Addendum B 11 5.B.2. n.3.] In addition, neither
BMC, nor future developers were required to pay flood control fees on Phases IV
5

In 1975, park fees were paid by individual lot owners, not developers.
[Addendum B 11 5.B.I.] Therefore, the only beneficiary of this portion of the
Agreement was the RP Zone lot owners who purchased lots from the developers,
not BMC or subsequent developers. [Id.]
10

through IX of Pepperwood because those phases were cclocated in that certain
portion of property identified on the Salt Lake County map where the City
anticipated that natural precipitation would be absorbed into the ground on site due
to the sandy soil conditions and relatively flat topography.55 [Id] However, the City
assessed the Plaintiffs5 flood control fees on Phase X - and subsequent phases - of
Pepperwood because: (1) the topography and soil density of the land rendered it
incapable of retaining or absorbing flood water on site; and (2) the City was
required to fund and construct major flood control infrastructure in those areas to
control flood water. [Addendum B 11 8.]
The Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit seeking a refund of the flood control fees
they had paid, and to avoid paying any future flood control fees on their
Pepperwood developments. [R. 001 - 058.] Plaintiffs argued that: (1) they were
either successors in interest to BMC or third party beneficiaries of the Agreement
[Id.]; and (2) under the terms of the Agreement, the City agreed to waive flood
control fees on all of the property described as the cc Horman properties55 in the
Agreement, except those lots located in the RP Zone. [R. 1464; Tr. pp. 70, 188;
Ex. 20.] The trial court entered Findings of Fact contrary to the Plaintiffs5 proposed
interpretation of the Agreement. 6 [Addendum B H 5.] The primary basis of the trial
6

In their brief, Plaintiffs contend that through a course of dealing the City is
essentially estopped to contest standing. [Pltfs5 Brief, pp. 26-7.] The trial court
11

court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims, however, was its determination that Plaintiffs
lacked standing to enforce the Agreement. [See id.]
Plaintiffs' Lack of Standing. The City and BMC are the only parties to the
Agreement. [Ex. 6(c).] None of the Plaintiffs were specifically named as
beneficiaries of the Agreement. [Addendum B 11 5, n.2; 1f 20; Ex. 6(c).] Indeed,
none of the Plaintiff entities even existed at the time the Agreement was executed.
[Addendum B 11 7.]
On October 23, 1987, BMC transferred by Warranty Deed to Longview
Development, a Utah corporation, all of its right, title and interest in and to the
remaining undeveloped property described in the Agreement as the "Horman
properties." [Addendum B 1110; Ex. 104; R. 1464; Tr. p. 211.] This Deed does
not make any mention of the Agreement. [See Ex. 104.] Subsequent to the transfer
of tide to the remaining undeveloped property described in the Agreement as the
"Horman properties" from BMC to Longview Development Corporation in 1987,
BMC wound up in its corporate affairs, paid its creditors, filed its final tax returns
and did not engage in any further business activity. [Addendum B 1111; Ex. 102; R.
1464; Tr. p. 220.] During the liquidation and winding up process of BMC, the

ruled that the argument was not timely raised [Addendum B p. 6, fn. 4] and thus
review here is precluded. Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P. 2d 602, 604 n.l (UT
App. 1993); Hartv.S.L. County, 945 P. 2d 125,136 (UT App. 1997).
12

Agreement was not assigned. [Addendum B U 16.] Indeed, the trial court
specifically found that:
The Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that
there was an act or manifestation by [BMC] indicating an
intent to transfer its rights in the 1975 Contract to
Longview Development at the time of transferring its
assets to Longview Development, therefore, there was no
intent to assign [BMCs] interest in the 1975 Contract to
Longview Development.
[Addendum B n.6.] Further, none of the vesting deeds which transfer all or any
portion of the undeveloped property referred to in the Agreement from Longview
Development to any of the Plaintiffs, make any mention of the Agreement. [See Ex.
104.] Finally, the City was never in the chain of tide to the undeveloped property
referred to in the Agreement as "Horman properties,53 nor was the Agreement ever
recorded with the County recorder's office. [Addendum B U 21.]
BMC was last renewed with the Utah Department of Commerce on August
17, 1992. [Addendum B 1112; Ex. 32.] On November 1, 1993, BMC was
administratively dissolved pursuant to statute, and no application for reinstatement
was filed within the two year period allowed for such action. [Addendum B 1113;
Ex. 32.] Approximately eighteen years after Bell Mountain Corporation was
liquidated and wound up its corporate affairs, eleven years after BMC was
administratively dissolved, and after the City had filed its Motion to Dismiss this

13

case, on November 8, 2005, Plaintiffs attempted to execute an assignment of the
Agreement from BMC to themselves in response to the City's Motion to Dismiss.
[Addendum B 1117; Ex. 25.] Plaintiffs argued that the Assignment: (1) was validly
executed as part of BMCs winding up process; and (2) was meant to substitute for
an assignment previously made by BMC to Plaintiffs. [R. 88.] The November 8,
2005 assignment, however, does not refer to any previous assignments made by
either BMC or Longview Development to any of the Plaintiffs. [Id; R. 1464; Tr.
p. 219.] Indeed, the trial court "did not find credible [Plaintiffs'] testimony that
their (sic) was a past assignment from Bell Mountain that could not be located and
this 2005 assignment was made to substitute that past assignment.5' [Addendum B 11
17n.5.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiffs lack standing to enforce the Agreement because the

Agreement is not a covenant that runs with the land. The Utah Supreme Court has
identified four elements required for a contractual covenant to run with the land: (1)
the covenant must touch and concern the land, (2) the covenanting parties must
intend the covenant to run with the land, (3) there must be privity of estate, and (4)
the agreement must be in writing. The absence of any of the four elements prevents
a covenant from running with the land. Here, two of the four required elements are

14

absent. The Agreement was i lot intei ided to 1:1 :i n with the la nd5 and there is no
privity <>i\^tvite.
A.

Plaintiffs lack standing to enforce the Agreement because the

Agreement was never lawfully assigned to the Plaintiffs. BMC did not execute an
assignment of the Agreement to Longview when BMC transferred all oi its rights,
ti tie and interest ii 1 the lai id comprisi ng tl le \ arious Pepperwood de\ elopments to
; *i :g- ir

1 °v

no evidence that Longview executed an

assignment of the Agreement when it transferred the land to Plaintiffs. In addition,
the 2005 Assignment allegedly executed by BMC to Plaintiffs is invalid. BMC was
liquidated and wound up its corporate affairs and ceased engaging in any business
activity after transferring the lai id 1 o 1 01 lg v leu i 1 1 ] 987 "B'ls 1C u as a lso
a d mi n istratrv 'el* " - <)l;v eel i 1 1 ] 993. ' I lit ; 1 s, u 1: id et ( Jta I: 11 Cod e /:\ 1 :i n § :o-iUa-1405(1),
BMC had no authority to engage in new business activity and execute the
assignment in 2005 because it had wound up its corporate affairs and was liquidated
almost twenty years earlier, and ceased to exist as a business entity at all over ten
years earlier.
Plaii it iffs lack st a nd ing to en force tl le A greement because Plaintiffs are
not third party beneficiaries of the Agreement. First, neither BMC nor the City
intended Plaintiffs to be third party beneficiaries because none of the Plaintiffs are

named in the Agreement. Indeed, none of the Plaintiff entities even existed at the
time the Agreement was executed. Second, even if the Plaintiffs are treated as
synonymous with the term "Horman properties" in the Agreement, Paragraph 12
clearly distinguishes between BMC, Horman properties and the RP Zone lot owners
and the benefits conferred upon each. BMC and the RP Zone lot owners were to
receive the benefit of the Fee Waiver Provision. Horman properties, however, was
to receive the benefit of deferring payment of all water connection fees and charges
until the individual lot owners applied for building permits. Finally, the facts that
existed at the time the Agreement was executed demonstrate that neither BMC nor
the City intended that all of the land that comprised Horman properties was to
receive the benefit of the fee waiver.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS
LACK STANDING TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE
THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT CREATE A COVENANT THAT
RUNS WITH THE LAND.
The trial court ruled that the Agreement did not create a covenant running

with the land because there was no privity of estate between the City and BMC, and
because Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to establish that BMC and the City ever
intended the Agreement to run with the land. [Addendum B 11 21.] Plaintiffs have
challenged that ruling, insisting that, as a matter of law, the Agreement runs with the
16

lai id.

\11 agreement creates a personal covenant when it gives rise to an enforceable
duty only between the original covenanting parties. By contrast, a covenant running
with the land creates an interest or burden based upon ownership of land. The Utah
Supreme Court has identified four elements required for a contractual covenant to
n i n with the land.
(I) the covenant must touch and concern the land, (2) the
covenanting parties must intend the covenant to run with
the land, (3) there must be privity of estate, and (4) the
agreement must be in writing.
Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 627 (Utah 1989).
The absence of any of the required elements ccprevents a covenant from running with
the land: 1 i d at o23.
I In ease Liv\ requires ilui Hie document: nvjiint?, a covenant running with the
land be in the chain of tide. This is the "privity of estate55 element outlined by the
Utah Supreme Court in Flying Diamond. "Privity of estate requires a particular
land of relationship between the original covenantor and the covenantee." I d at
628.
Th e types of privity [of estate] are (1) mutual, i.e., a
covenant arising from simultaneous interests in the same
land; (2) horizontal, i.e.^ a covenant created in connection
with the conveyance of an estate from one of the parties to
another; and (3) vertical, i.e.^ the devolution of an estate
1 7

burdened or benefitted by a covenant from an original
covenanting party to a successor.
Id. (citations, footnote omitted). The key is that by one or more of the three
methods noted above, privity must exist between the original covenantor and
covenantee. In the instant case, the Agreement lies outside the chain of title and
lacks the requisite privity of estate. First, Sandy City was never in the chain of title
to the property in issue. [See Addendum B 11 21; Ex. 104.] Second, the deed
whereby BMC transferred the property mentioned in the Agreement to Longview
Development makes no mention of the Agreement. [See Ex. 4.] Third, the deeds
whereby Longview Development transferred the property mentioned in the
Agreement to Plaintiffs also make no mention of the Agreement. [See id] The
absence of privity of estate precludes the argument that the Agreement created a
covenant that runs with the land.
In addition, there is no evidence of intent by the parties that the Agreement
was to run with the land. The Flying Diamond court held that an express written
statement that the parties intend the covenant to run with the land is dispositive of
the issue of intent. I d at 627. The inverse of that rule of law exists here - there is
no such express statement. There is no language in the Agreement evidencing intent
that the Fee Waiver Provision extend beyond the property being developed at the
time it was owned by BMC. Moreover, one cannot intend to create rights in entities
18

tl: lat do i ic t e\ en exist Tl le ^ • er y propositioi 1 defeats itself. ' rhe boilerplate la nguage
in paragraph 20 of the Agreement providing that the Agreement is "binding on both
parties, their successors and assigns55 does not make the covenant ccrun with the
land.55 It merely acknowledges that the document is assignable. A successor to the
contract is not necessarily a successor to al 1 of the lai id mentioi led 1:1: 1 tl: le coi it::i: act hi na* ihr inconsistency of I'laintiftV position. Different hiiul w as com c \cd I<I
different Plaintiffs and yet they all claim that they were assigned the Agreement. The
Agreement is not severable to be carved up in so many pieces. The assertion makes
no sense. Also, the Agreement was never recorded. Nothing in the chain of title to
the property in question identifies 01 in anyway mentions ; ,A Agreement.
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therefore, does not run with die land.
IT

THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING TO
ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE AGREEMENT
WAS NEVER LAWFUT T v ASSIGNED TO PT ATNTTPP.S.
I he tria 1 coi :i i: I: found a s a matter of fact that the \ greement was not assigned

during the winding up process of BMC. [Addendum B 11 lo. j This finding of fact
has not been challenged. The only other possibility for assignment occurred when
an assignment was created in response to the City^s initial Motion to Dismiss. The
19

trial court ruled that this 2005 assignment was void because BMC no longer existed
as a viable entity by that time because by 2005 it had been dissolved by the state, its
affairs had been wound up, assets transferred and too much time had passed to
reasonably contend that any corporate viability remained in BMC. [Addendum B 11
19.] The trial court's legal conclusion has been challenged by the Plaintiffs in this
appeal.
For Plaintiffs to achieve standing by demonstrating that BMC lawfully
assigned its contractual rights under the Agreement to Plaintiffs in order for
Plaintiffs to be lawful assignees to the Agreement, they needed to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that BMC validly assigned the Agreement to
Longview Development, and that Longview Development validly assigned the
Agreement to each of the Plaintiffs. The evidence presented at trial (or rather the
lack of it) conclusively demonstrated that no such assignments were ever made - and
the court so found. [Addendum B HIT 16, 17.]
Six years prior to its administrative dissolution in 1993, Bell Mountain
distributed its real property assets - *.£., the 900+ acres comprising the various
Pepperwood developments - to Longview Development. According to Plaintiffs,
upon transferring the property to Longview Development, BMC was "liquidated"
and wound up its corporate affairs, paid its creditors, filed its final tax returns and

20

d id not engage in a ny fi :i i t:l: ler bi :i si i less acti\ ity. [ Ex ] 02; R 1 i 6 1; I r. p 220 ]
J^Q ^

QQ^^ ilQ^i/UT ^ e x e c u t e

aily

assignment of its rights under the Agreement to

Longview Development prior to or during BMCs liquidation and/or winding upon
process:
Q [by Ait. Hunt]: And so it went to Longview, the
assignment would have been from Bell Mountain to
Longview, correct?
A [by Mr. Evansj: Y ou know, the liquidation of Bell
Mountain Corporation was a very complex liquidation.
You're dealing with a company that had been in existence so the answer to your question is no, its more complex
than ha
So the answer to that is no.
[R 1464; Tr. p. 211.] (emphasis added). Indeed, David Evans, Plaintiffs'
accountant who managed the HM(, liquidation, admitted iTui

I J« mlu dui 1 w as

even au a re of that specific mriiunt when we did |the liquidate >n| h.uk in "X'"7

I

don't recall specifically addressing the 1975 agreement as part of the liquidation."
[iv. Ti64, Tr. p. io5.] Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of
assignments of the Agreement made by Longview Development to Plaintiffs - that is
because no such assignments were ever made. Plaintiits3 assertion that the) are
] a wft il assignees of the \ greement i s & ithoi it i neri t

tl lere is simpl> no ev idence to

support the proposition and they have utterly failed to marshal the evidence and
attack the findings made by the trial court.
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Further evidence of the lack of any lawful assignment of the Agreement is
found in Plaintiffs5 belated attempt to execute an assignment in response to Sandy
City's Motion to Dismiss this action. On November 8, 2005 - over three months
after they commenced this litigation, nearly twenty years after BMC wound up its
corporate affairs and over ten years after BMC was administratively dissolved Plaintiffs attempted to execute an "assignment" of the Agreement from BMC
directiy to Plaintiffs. [Ex. 25.] Not only is the November 8, 2005 assignment an
indisputable confession that a valid assignment of the Agreement was never made, it
is invalid on its face.
It is well-settled that Plaintiffs' attempt at assignment by a defunct business
entity is prohibited by law. Under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l), after BMC
was administratively dissolved by operation of law on November 1, 1993, it had
authority only to conduct activities "appropriate to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs.55 According to Plaintiffs5 witness, David Evans, however, Bell
Mountain had completed the winding up process and was "liquidated55 six years
earlier, namely, in 1987 when it transferred all of its undeveloped property to
Longview Development. [Ex. 102; R. 1464; Tr. p. 220.] Indeed, according to Mr.
Evans, following this "liquidation55, BMC ceased to engage in any further business
activity. [Id] Thus, under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l), BMC had no

22

ai itl iorit\ to enga ge ii i ne w bi is.ii less activit ) > a nd exec\ ite tl ic assignmei it in
because it had wound up its corporate affairs and was liquidated almost twenty years
earlier, and had ceased to exist as a business entity at all over ten years earlier.
Case law from other jurisdictions confirms this conclusion. The Maine
Supreme Court addressed the issue of assignment by a dissolved corporatioii i n facts
IW (, i

simi lar to those here. Sturtevant v. Winthrop, 7M A It! 2(A u \k

In

Sturtc\anu J corporation h/ul tntiTuJ into ,i snow mno\,il contract with a town.
The corporation was subsequentiy dissolved and the sole shareholder continued to
perform snow removal services until the contract was terminated by the City for
cause. The shareholder sued and the town asserted that he lacked standing because
the contract w ^
si l a r e h o l d e r - o M
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corporate assets and liabilities were distributed to him personally i- ine dissolution.
The trial court found no evidence of a specific assignment and held that there was no
assignment of the contract. The Maine Supreme Court affirmed.
I lie Sturtevant court fir st noted tl lat tl le plai ntiffl lad the bu rden of pi oof to
establish the assigi :i n lei it b> a pre: poi id era i ice of e\ idei ice. Id. at 267 ' Die court
concluded that the burden was not met.
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For an assignment to be enforceable there must be an act
or manifestation by the assignor indicating the intent to
transfer the right to the assignee. In this case there was no
evidence of a manifestation of the corporate intent to
transfer the contract rights at the time the corporation was
in existence, and the trial court was not compelled to find
that an assignment had occurred. No corporate records
were presented to show that an assignment had taken
place while the corporation was in existence.
Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
In a footnote, the court suggested the possibility that even if the assignment
were made, it would not be effective beyond the existence of the corporation, in that
case two years after dissolution pursuant to statute.
Even if the court had found an assignment, it is not clear it
would give Sturtevant the right to sue on the contract
more than two years after the dissolution. Several courts
have concluded that an assignee of a corporate right
cannot assert that right after the expiration of the survival
statute, because that would violate the rule that an assignee
has no greater rights than his assignor and would defeat
the statute's purpose of providing a fixed time limit for the
wind up of corporate affairs.
Sturtevant at 267 n.4 (citations omitted); see also Davis v. St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 727 F.Supp. 549, 553 (D. S.D. 1989) (extending corporate rights beyond
the two-year renewal period ccwould expand the corporate survival statute beyond its
terms and would interfere with its purpose of requiring the prompt and orderly
winding up and finalization of corporate affairs.53) Utah law is in accord: Aird Ins.
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Agency v. Zions 1st Natl Bank, 61 2 P.2c 134] 5 344 ( C Ji ; i 1 i] 980) (cc[ \]n assignee

Lone Mountain Production Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 701 l : .N^pi\ 3U5, 309
(D. Ut. 1989) (ccOnce a valid assignment is made, the assignee stands in the shoes of
the assignor; the assignee gains nothing more than his assignor had.55)
Moreover, absent evidence of intent to create the assignment prior to the
assignmei it acti la 1 1 y being made , the Sturtevant coi i r t refu sed to find a i i assignmei it
based

• * *.*bsequent conduct.
Simply because a corporation is dissolved and the
shareholder represents, in the boilerplate language of the
articles of dissolution form, that the corporate assets have
been distributed to the shareholder does not necessarily
mean that a contract to which the corporation was a party
has been assigned to the shareholder.

Sturtevant, 7M A,2d «n 2()" uhMinguislmig Ufwcrn " m n i n c t s " ,unl a j\\et\ 'i
A 1 C\MS .appellate* court reached ;i siiniLri* a inrliisuni

il

( )hviously an assignee

cannot sue on a claim obtained from the corporation after it [the corporation] loses
tlie right to do business in Texas because such a rule would encourage assignment of
claims rather than payment of [corporate] franchise taxes.55 Rushing v. lnt 5 l Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. »
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Pla i ntifFs to assign the A greement after BMC lost the right to do business in Utah
over ten years prior to the assignment would undermine the very purpose of Utah
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Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l) and Utah's corporate laws generally.
The City is aware of Plaintiffs5 argument that because the Utah statutory
scheme does not expressly put a specific time limit on the winding up process, there
is no boundary whatsoever to limit that process. [Pis.5 Br. pp. 31-32.] It is an
axiom of statutory and contract construction that if no time limit is stated for the
performance of a particular act, a reasonable time is implied. 2A Sutherland
Statutory Construction, § 45:12 (7th Ed.); Alpha Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv.
Mgmt., LLC, 2006 UT App 331,11 24, 153 P.3d 714. Here, the lower court
concluded that Plaintiffs5 attempt to assign the Agreement 12+ years after
administrative dissolution was not reasonable. [Addendum B 11 20.]
The only document presented by Plaintiffs purporting to be an assignment of
the Agreement was executed almost twenty years after BMC wound up its corporate
affairs, and over ten years after BMC completely ceased to exist as a business entity.
As a result, the November 8, 2005 assignment is void as a matter of law. Further,
Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that Longview Development - Bell
Mountain^ successor entity - executed any assignments to the Plaintiffs at all. And
the court so found. [Addendum If 1116, 17.] Indeed, Plaintiffs5 belated attempt to
invalidly assign the Agreement by a defunct corporation after they filed suit is
nothing more than an admission that they lacked standing to enforce the Agreement

26

i i: i the first insta nee
v ]i it is have completely failed to attack the findings of the trial court that no
assignment was made. Thus, those findings are conclusive on the issue.
Ill

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFFS
LACK STANDING TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENT BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES OF THE
AGREEMENT.
Pla intifPs tl: :i i rd pa r try bei leficia r ) argi :i ments fa il for 1:\A;ro fi :i nda mei ita] reasoi is.

First, tl le contra ct lai iguage does not establisl 1 a i :i inter it to coi lfer a separate and
distinct benefit upon them. Secondly, their derivation of beneficiary status is based
upon reference to real properties rather than to an identifiable individual or entity.
It is well-established that the existence of third-party beneficiary status is
determined fron* \;\: face ot me contract at issue. Wagner v. Clifton, J.* <»..

i

\

American Towers Owners \, OCI Mechanical, 930 l\2d 1182, 1188 ^Utah 1996).
Under Utah law, cc[t]he written contract must show that the contracting parties
clearly intended to confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party.'3
Wagner, 2002 11 ;ii "I I 1 (punctuation omitted, emphasis a o c j .

i buitrK here

do i lot ar gu e or d emonstrate tl lat the parti es to tl le Agreement intend ed to cor lfer a
benefit which was separate and distinct from those conferred by the Agreement on
the named parties. They argue that because they own the realty identified in the
27

Agreement as "Horman properties'5, they are entitled to succeed to BMCs interest in
the agreement, and to procure the benefit which BMC would have had under the
Agreement. That factual scenario does not satisfy the "separate and distinct benefit53
element of the proof of third-party beneficiary status. The identity of the third party
upon whom the benefit was to be conferred must have been in contemplation at the
time the agreement was created - here it was not because those entities did not exist.
A reference to "Horman properties55 does not translate to "all known and unknown,
existent and non-existent successors in tide55 as contended by Plaintiffs. The
interpretive leap transcends reason.
Plaintiffs5 second problem is whether there was a clear intent expressed in the
agreement to create a benefit to any third party. The problem lies in Plaintiffs5
attempt to characterize the term "Horman properties55 as meaning anything other
than real properties owned by the Horman family. Plaintiffs concede that there has
never been any entity named "Horman properties.55 [R. p. 324.] Instead, they seek
to characterize the term as "a generic reference to all real estate and real estate
entities belonging to or related in any way to the Horman family.55 [Id] What
Plaintiffs want is for the Court to infer from the term "Horman properties55 that the
parties to the agreement clearly intended to confer a benefit on entities which did
not exist and might never exist. That not being enough, they want to extend that
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benefit to anyone to whom they might convey the properties at some indeterminate
time in the future. The proposition means that third-party beneficiary status could
be created incidentally by virtue of poor drafting without any expressed intent to do
so. The scope of the third-party beneficiary law does not reach that far.
The trial court found that the waiver of flood control fees inured only to the
benefit of those RP Zone Lot Owners. [Addendum B 11 20.] Plaintiffs have failed
to advance any plausible reading of the Agreement to the contrary and none exists.
The ruling of the lower court should stand.
CONCLUSION
In this appeal, Plaintiffs seek to overturn, as a matter of law, the ruling of the
trial court that they have no standing to enforce a 1975 Agreement to which none of
them were parties. Through all of the briefing of two motions at the trial level,
Plaintiffs maintained that the controlling issues were factual. Now on appeal when
the burden has shifted, the Plaintiffs attempt to morph the controlling issues into
legal questions. What the trial court actually did was to hear and review the evidence
and make detailed, contextual findings of fact to establish contractual intent, find
facts relevant to the standing issue and thus support the ultimate conclusion of law
that Plaintiffs had no standing to enforce the 1975 Agreement. With those findings
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intact and legally unassailed, no other plausible legal conclusion follows. The
judgment of the trial court should therefore be affirmed in all particulars.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %<\ day of December, 2009.
WILLIAMS & HUNT

q^jS^

By

GEORGE A/HUNT
STEPHEN T>HESTER
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Sandy City
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the %L(

day of December, 2009,1 caused two (2)

true and correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed postage prepaid thereon, by
First Class Mail in the United States Mail, to the following:
Denver C. Snuffer
Steven R. Paul
Daniel B. Garriott
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C.
10885 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84070
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ADDENDUM A

16-10a-1405. Effect of dissolution.

(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry on any
business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may
provide for closing the corporation's share transfer records;
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from those prescribed in
Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate
name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation on the effective date
of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.

History: C. 1953,16-10a-1405, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 156.

© 2009 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

ADDENDUM B

IN AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

HILLCREST INVESTMENT, a Utah
Partnership; SCANDIA INVESTMENT LLC,
a Utah Limited Liability Company; LEGACY
COMMUNITIES, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company; CHARLES H.
HORMAN, an Individual; and M. GORDON
JOHNSON, an Individual; AUTUMN RIDGE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC a Utah Limited
Liability Company; ALTA RIDGE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company, all successors in interest
to BELL MOUNTAIN CORPORATION,

|
|
]
]

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

Civil No . 050408561
Plaintiffs,
| Judge Royal I. Hansen
vs.
SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation and
JOHN DOES 1-20,
Defendants.
This matter came before the Court for trial on October 21s' through the 23rd of 2008, with the
Honorable Royal I. Hansen presiding without a jury. Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. and Dan B. Garriott appeared
on behalf of Hillcrest Investment; Scandia Investment, LLC; Legacy Communities, LLC; Charles H.
Horman; M. Gordon Johnson; Autumn Ridge Development, LLC; Alta Ridge Development, LLC
(collectively referred to as "Plaintiffs"). George A. Hunt and Stephen T. Hester appeared on behalf of Sandy

1

City ("City"). At the end of the trial, the Court requested the parties submit post trial briefs and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and set the matter for argument on December 10, 2008.
With regard to the Dewey Bluth affidavit, the Court admitted the affidavit and gave it the weight and
credibility the Court deemed necessary in making its findings of facts and conclusions of law. Having
considered the evidence and testimony received at trial, the parties' arguments and the law, the Court enters
the following FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On June 25, 1975, the City entered into a contract with non-party Bell Mountain Corporation (Bell
Mountain) as the developer of a large tract of land on the east side of the city referred to as the
"Pepperwood Subdivision," which was a "'private' subdivision having development of its own
streets, parks, etc." (1975 Contract). At the time of entering into the 1975 Contract, Bell Mountain
Corporation was a Utah for-profit corporation originally formed on August 6, 1971.

2.

In the preamble of the 1975 Contract, the parties acknowledged that the City "has a need to increase
water storage and production in its corporate limits particularly on its east side" and that "Bell
Mountain is developing a large tract of land on the City's east side." Bell Mountain "desires to assist
Sandy in achieving its goals regarding water development and distribution while likewise developing
its own properties."1

1

Prior to entering into the 1975 Contract, the City had passed a moratorium that
prohibited any new home construction or lot development due to a lack of water resources that
would provide adequate fire protection flow rates and water pressure required to comply with the
Board of Health. The 1975 Contract was an attempt to address this problem and cause the City
to remove the moratorium so that Bell Mountain could continue its development of the
Pepperwood Subdivision.
2

3.

At the time the City and Bell Mountain entered into the 1975 Contract, only a portion of the
Pepperwood Subdivision was annexed into the City, about two phases containing 141 RP Zoned lots,
some of which had been sold to lot owners.

4.

Paragraph 12 of the 1975 Contract states:
In consideration of the above mentioned efforts and expenditures of Bell
Mountain Corporation, Sandy shall defer payment of all water connection
fees and charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain
Corporation and Horman properties located east of 2000 east, north of 12000
south and south of 10000 south until such time as building permits are
applied for by the individual owners of the lots contained therein and shall
require payment from the said individual owners rather than Bell Mountain
Corporation such fees as may be required shall be charged as provided by the
then covenant fee resolution except that with relation to lots located in the
"RP Zone", neither Bell Mountain Corporation nor the owners of the said lots
located in the Pepperwood Subdivision shall be required to pay "flood control
fees" as part of a connection fee and shall pay only one half of the otherwise
required "park fee."

5.

As reflected by the language in Paragraph 12, the City and Bell Mountain expressly intended to
provide "Horman properties" and the RP Zone lot owners2 in the Pepperwood Subdivision limited
benefits under the 1975 Contract:
A.

The City and Bell Mountain intended for "Horman properties," which was described as
properties "located east of 2000 east, north of 12000 south and south of 10000 south," to
receive the limited benefit of a deferment of "payment of all water connection fees and
charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman

2

At the time the parties entered into the 1975 Contract, the only lots located in the "RP
Zone" consisted of Phases I, II and in of the Pepperwood Subdivision. The remaining property
then owned by Bell Mountain Corporation and identified as "Horman properties" in the 1975
Contract was either zoned "A-l" (Agricultural), or had not yet been annexed into Sandy City.
3

properties

until such time as building permits are applied for by the individual owners

of the lots contained therein." Those fees would then be charged to the individual owners of
the lots. The Horman properties as described in the 1975 Contract encompassed about 1000
acres that belonged to the Horman family and the family's various legal entities.
B.

The City and Bell Mountain also intended for the owners of the RP Zone lots located in the
Pepperwood Subdivision to benefit from the 1975 Contract. Specifically, Bell Mountain and
the RP Zone lot owners would (1) not be required to pay "flood control fees" as part of a
connection fee, and (2) only be required to pay one half of the otherwise required park fee.

1.

In 1975, park fees were paid by individual lot owners, not developers, therefore, the
only beneficiary of this portion of paragraph 12 was the RP Zone lot owners that
bought lots in the Pepperwood Subdivision.

2.

With regard to flood control fees, prior to 1975, Salt Lake County was responsible
for flood control in the east side of the City, including the property then owned by
Bell Mountain Corporation and Horman properties.

However, by Interlocal

Agreement dated December 19,1974 and amended February 3,1975, flood control
responsibility for surface waters on the east side was assumed by the City. Neither
Salt Lake County nor the City charged Bell Mountain flood control fees on prior
Phases I and E of the Pepperwood Subdivision.3 The City began charging developers

3

There was also sufficient evidence submitted to find that for Phase III neither Salt Lake
County nor the City charged Bell Mountain Corporation flood control fees on Phase EI of the
4

flood control maintenance fees around March 20, 1975, however, no fees were
charged to Bell Mountain and later developers of the property, namely the Plaintiffs,
for the first nine phases of the development of the area based upon a map prepared
by Salt Lake County. During the time Salt Lake County had flood control
responsibility over the initial phases of the Pepperwood Subdivision, Salt Lake
County had developed a map which identified certain portions of the Horman
property where it was anticipated that natural precipitation would be absorbed into
the ground on site due to the sandy soil conditions and the relatively flat topography.
The first nine phases of the Pepperwood Subdivision are located in that certain
portion of property identified on the Salt Lake County map where the City anticipated
that natural precipitation would be absorbed into the ground on site due to the sandy
soil conditions and the relatively flat topography. Therefore, minimal, flood control
infrastructure was required to be installed in the first nine phases.
6.

Paragraph 20 of the 1975 Contract states: "This agreement is binding upon both parties, their
successors and assigns."

Pepperwood Subdivision because of (1) the County's analysis of surface water drainage indicated
that the property would be contained on site, and (2) Mr. Horman's representation that "potential
flood damage up to a ten (10) year storm becomes the responsibility of the Pepperwood
Homeowner's Association."

7.

All of the Plaintiffs claim an interest in the 1975 Contract between the City and Bell Mountain either
as assigned successors in interest of Bell Mountain or as third party beneficiaries.4
A.

Plaintiffs Charles H. Horman ("Horman") and M. Gordon Johnson ("Johnson") are
individuals who reside in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and who, variously, own and
manage the other Plaintiff entities.

B.

Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment Company, LLC ("Hillcrest") is currently a limited liability
company. Originally, Hillcrest was formed as a limited partnership on October 16,1978, and
then later it was converted into a Utah limited liability company. Currently, Hillcrest is
managed by Horman, Evans and Christopher A. Ho wells.

C.

Plaintiff Scandia Investment, LLC ("Scandia") is a Utah limited liability company created
on August 10,1993. Scandia's members are Johnson and his wife, Veedrienne H. Johnson.
Veedrienne is the sister of Horman. Scandia is managed by Johnson, and non-parties David
Evans ("Evans") and David B. Bromley ("Bromley").

D.

Plaintiff Legacy Communities, LLC ("Legacy") is a Utah limited liability company that was
created December 29, 2003. Legacy's managers are Horman, Johnson and Evans.

4

The Court notes that in the Plaintiffs post trial brief and at closing argument seemed to
be making an equitable claim that based upon the past actions of the City and reliance of the
Plaintiffs that they were parties or beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract that the City was estopped
from claiming otherwise now. However, as argued by the City at closing arguments, Plaintiffs
did not make an estoppel claim, rather this case was tried as a breach of contract, therefore, the
Court does not consider promissory estoppel to the extent such arguments were made by the
Plaintiffs.
6

E.

Plaintiff Autumn Ridge Development, LLC ("Autumn Ridge") is a Utah limited liability
company created on January 21,1994. Autumn Ridge5s members are Johnson and his wife,
Veedrienne H. Johnson. Autumn Ridge is managed by Johnson, Evans and Bromley.

F.

Plaintiff Alta Ridge Development, LLC ("Alta Ridge") is a Utah limited liability company
created on April 12, 1994. Alta Ridge's members are Horman and his wife, Katherine K.
Horman. Alta Ridge is managed by Horman.

The City assessed the Plaintiffs flood control fees on Phase X of the Pepperwood development
because (1) the topography and soil density of the land rendered it incapable of retaining or
absorbing flood water on site, and (2) the City was required to construct major flood control
infrastructure in those areas to control flood water.
The Plaintiffs paid flood control fees under protest and later sought refunds for the protested flood
control fees claiming that pursuant to the 1975 Contract they were either successors in interest to
Bell Mountain or third party beneficiaries. Specifically, Plaintiffs state in their answers to
interrogatories that:
This is based upon the agreement between Bell Mountain Corporation and
Sandy City, in which both Bell Mountain Corporation and "Horman
Properties" are listed as the beneficiaries of the agreement. Although Bell
Mountain Corporation was a signatory to the agreement the property was
developed using various entities. "Horman Properties" was a way of
referring to the property the Horman family would develop and retail. All of
the named plaintiffs in this case are affiliated with Bell Mountain
Corporation, and are included within the description "Horman Properties"
and are therefore successors to the agreement or were intended to be covered
by the agreement when it was originally entered into with Sandy City.

7

10.

On October 23, 1987, Bell Mountain Corporation transferred by Warranty Deed to Longview
Development, a Utah corporation, all of its right, title and interest in and to the remaining
undeveloped property described in the June 25,1975 Agreement as the "Horman properties." This
Deed does not mention the 1975 Contract, and the 1975 Contract was not recorded with the Salt
Lake County recorders office.

11.

In 1987, Bell Mountain wound up its corporate affairs, paid its creditors, filed itsfinaltax returns
and did not engage in any further business activity.

12.

Bell Mountain was last renewed with the Utah Department of Commerce on August 17, 1992.

13.

Thereafter, on November 1,1993, Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved pursuant to statute,
and no application for reinstatement wasfiledwithin the two year period allowed for such action.

14.

At the time of its renewal in 1992, the directors of Bell Mountain were plaintiffs Horman and
Johnson, as well as non-party Evans. At the time of the administrative dissolution in 1993, Horman
was the president, Johnson was the vice-president and Evans was the secretary and treasurer.

15.

According to the certified file on Bell Mountain kept by the Utah Department of Commerce, neither
an articles of dissolution nor apian of dissolution were everfiledwith the Department of Commerce
nor was a liquidation agreement whereby all contracts were assigned to Bell Mountain's successor
entity ever filed with the Department of Commerce. The last written document contained in the
official certified file of Bell Mountain Corporation is dated August 2, 1989.

16.

During the liquidation and winding up processes of Bell Mountain, the 1975 Contract was not
assigned.
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17.

In 2006, over eleven years after Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved and only after
Plaintiffs filed this law suit and the City filed a motion to dismiss in this case, Plaintiffs executed
an assignment of the 1975 Contract by Bell Mountain directly to Plaintiffs.5
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

18.

"Generally, unless a plaintiff can recover on a contract as a third-party beneficiary or an assignee,
only parties to a contract can bring suit under the contract." See Holmes Development LLC v. Cook,
2002 UT 38; 48 P.3d 895; 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 20; 2002 Utah LEXIS 64. Plaintiffs were not party
to the 1975 Contract they sue to enforce, therefore, to have standing to sue Plaintiffs must be
assignees of Bell Mountain or intended third-party beneficiaries of the 1975 Contract.

19.

Plaintiffs claim they have standing as successors in interest to Bell Mountain. A dissolved entity
may only conduct activities "appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs/' Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405(l). For an enforceable assignment there must be an act or manifestation
by the assignor indicating the intent to transfer the right to the assignee at the time the corporation
was in existence.6 With regard to the 2005 assignment to Plaintiffs that was executed by Bell
Mountain such assignment was not made during Bell Mountain's existence and therefore was

5

The Court notes the Court did not find credible the testimony that their was a past
assignment from Bell Mountain that could not be located and this 2005 assignment was made to
substitute that past assignment.
6

The Court notes that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that there was an
act or manifestation by Bell Mountain indicating an intent to transfer its rights in the 1975
Contract to Longview Development at the time of transferring its assets to Longview
Development, therefore, there was no intent to assign its interests in the 1975 Contract to
Longview Development.
9

untimely. In 2005, Bell Mountain was an entity that had been administratively dissolved for over
eleven years. The winding up of a corporation is not indefinite. The purpose of the liquidation and
winding up period is to collect its assets, dispose of properties that will not be distributed in kind to
its shareholders, discharge its liabilities, and to distribute its remaining property among its
shareholders. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405. If Bell Mountain was still winding up its affairs after
its administrative dissolution, then for Bell Mountain to continue to act as a legal entity it should
have applied for reinstatement within two years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1422. Since
Bell Mountain failed to do so, it was no longer a legal entity in 2005 when the assignment was
executed, therefore, the Court will not give the assignment any legal effect from a dissolved entity
with no legal capacity. See, e.g. Bio-Trust, Inc. V. Division of Corporations, 2003 UT App. 360
(concluding that the corporation lacked standing because it lacked legal capacity ten years after its
administrative dissolution to challenge the dissolution).

Furthermore, after two years, an

administratively dissolved entity's name is available for use. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1421(1).
To allow a dissolved entity to continue liquidating and winding up its affairs after two years could
create confusion if another entity legally registers to use its name. This case is not a close call. In
this case, the 2005 assignment was made eleven years after Bell Mountain was dissolved. The Court
concludes that the 2005 assignment did not constitute a timely liquidating or winding up activity
because the assignment was made eleven years after Bell Mountain was administratively dissolved.
To allow an entity to liquidate and wind up its affairs for such a long period of time would encourage
a lack of diligence in the dissolution of a corporation and open the door for a plethora of problems
with legally registered entities using the same name. Based upon the discussion above, the Court
10

concludes that Plaintiffs were not assignees of Bell Mountain. The Court concludes Plaintiffs claim
that they have standing based upon an assignment fails.
The existence of a third-party beneficiary status "is determined by examining a written contract."
American Towers Owners Assoc, Inc. v. CCI Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1996).
"Generally, the rights of a third-party beneficiary are determined by the intentions of the parties to
the subject contract." Tracy CollinsBank& Trustv. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314,1315 (Utah 1982).
"The intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear." Ron
Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382,1386 (Utah 1989). "A thirdparty
who benefits only incidentallyfromthe performance of a contract has no right to recover under that
contract." Broadwaterv. OldRepublic Sur., 854P.2d527, 537 (Utah 1993). "If the language within
the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determinedfromthe plain
meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law."
WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 54 P.2d 1139 (UT 2002)(quotations omitted). Whether
a third-party beneficiary status exists is determined by examining a written contract. In Paragraph
12 of the 1975 Contract, there were two express third-party beneficiaries, "Horman properties" and
the RP Zone lot owners. Even if the Court treats the Plaintiffs as the "Horman properties" described
under the 1975 Contract, which this Court need not decide, the intended benefit conferred upon them
was not for waiver of flood control fees. Rather, the benefit to Horman properties was to "defer
payment of all water connection fees and charges which would otherwise be made to Bell Mountain
Corporation and Horman properties." The waiver of flood control fees as part of a connection fee
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was to benefit Bell Mountain and the RP Zone lot owners.7 Paragraph 12 clearly distinguishes
between Bell Mountain, Horman properties and RP Zone lot owners and the benefit conferred upon
each. The Court concludes that even if the Plaintiffs are "Horman properties" under the 1975
Contract, they were not the intended third-party beneficiary for the waiver of flood control fees. The
Court concludes that without third-party beneficiary status for the waiver of flood control fees, the
Plaintiffs lack standing to sue to enforce that portion of the 1975 Contract.
21.

Plaintiffs also claim standing based upon the waiver of flood control fees as a covenant that runs
with the land. For a contractual covenant to run with the land:
(1) the covenant must touch and concern the land, (2) the covenanting parties
must intend the covenant to run with the land, (3) there must be privity of
estate, and (4) the agreement must be in writing. Flying Diamond Oil Cor.
v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 627 (Utah 1989).
The absence of any of the four elements "prevents a covenant from running with the land." Id. at
623. The first and fourth elements are clearly met. However, the required privity of estate is lacking
because (1) the City was never in the chain of title to the property at issue, and (2) the 1975 Contract
is outside the chain of title because (a) it was not recorded with the County recorder's office, (b) the
deed whereby Bell Mountain transferred the property did not refer to the 1975 Contract, and (c) the
deeds in which Longview Development transferred the property to Plaintiffs also failed to refer to
the 1975 Contract. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs failed to meet its burden to show that the intent of the

7

The Court notes that whether the parties intended the waiver of flood control fees to be
limited to the RP Zone lot owners existing at the time of the 1975 Contract or extended to all
future RP Zone lot owners is not before the Court, therefore, the Court does not address that
issue.
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parties that the 1975 Contract or the waiver offloodcontrol fees provision would run with the land.
The boilerplate language in paragraph 20 of the 1975 Contract that it is "binding on both parties,
their successors and assigns" merely acknowledges that the document is assignable, not that the flood
control fee waiver was a covenant that would run with the land beyond that property being developed
at the time. The Court concludes that the flood control fee waiver provision was not a covenant
running with the land, therefore, the Plaintiffs' claim for standing on that basis fails.
22.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs lack standing to sue for breach of the 1975 Contractfloodcontrol
fee waiver provision for which they sue to enforce. Without standing, this Court may not grant the
relief requested by Plaintiffs.

23.

Based upon the Court's decision that the Plaintiffs lack standing, the Court need not address the
other claims and arguments raised by the parties.
ORDER
The Court hereby ORDERS the City to file a Final Judgment and Order for this Court to sign

within twenty (20) days.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2009.
BY THE COURT:

ROYAL I. HANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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